Private Practice for Public Consumption: Two Views of Corporate Law by Barnard, Jayne W.
College of William & Mary Law School
William & Mary Law School Scholarship Repository
Faculty Publications Faculty and Deans
1993
Private Practice for Public Consumption: Two
Views of Corporate Law
Jayne W. Barnard
William & Mary Law School, jwbarn@wm.edu
Copyright c 1993 by the authors. This article is brought to you by the William & Mary Law School Scholarship Repository.
http://scholarship.law.wm.edu/facpubs
Repository Citation
Barnard, Jayne W., "Private Practice for Public Consumption: Two Views of Corporate Law" (1993). Faculty Publications. 317.
http://scholarship.law.wm.edu/facpubs/317
HeinOnline -- 73 B.U. L. Rev. 121 1993
REVIEW ESSAY 
PRIVATE PRACTICE FOR PUBLIC CONSUMPTION: 
TWO VIEWS OF CORPORATE LAW 
BROKEN CONTRACT: A MEMOIR OF HARVARD LAW SCHOOL. 
By Richard D. Kahlenberg. 
Hill and Wang, New York, 1992. 
Pp. xiv, 238. $22.00. 
TOMBSTONES: A LAWYER'S TALES FROM THE TAKEOVER DECADES. 
By Lawrence Lederman. 
Farrar, Straus & Giroux, New York, 1992. 
Pp. 358. $24.00. 
Reviewed by Jayne W. Barnard* 
Richard Kahlenberg, Harvard Law School class of 1989, recently pub-
lished a memoir of his career in the law.1 His thesis is that law schools 
generally, and Harvard Law School in particular, admit promising young 
college graduates poised to seek justice for the poor. The schools then 
methodically extract the idealism from these students, ultimately transform-
ing even the best of them into cookie-cutter graduates who want only to 
work for big-city law firms, "toiling for the richest of the rich. "2 Somehow 
Kahlenberg escaped this fate, though he concedes his escape was a narrow 
one. 
Kahlenberg is the product of a seven-year Harvard education financed, 
evidently, by his middle-class family. After rejecting a job offer from Cov-
ington & Burling and accepting instead a mid-level staff position with Sen. 
Chuck Robb (D-Va.), Kahlenberg apparently believes that he chose the 
moral high ground. It is a dubious proposition. Nevertheless, his hypothe-
sis, that law schools offer an "implicit contract"3 to lead their students 
toward a career in public service and then breach that contract by stressing 
corporate-oriented coursework, may be worth exploring. I do not intend to 
• Professor of Law, The College of William & Mary. My thanks to Susan Korzick, 
class of 1993, for her research and technical assistance on this essay. 
1 RICHARD D. KAHLENBERG, BROKEN CONTRACT: A MEMOIR OF HARVARD LAW 
SCHOOL (1992) [hereinafter BROKEN CONTRACT]. 
2 /d. at 233. 
3 /d. at 237. 
121 
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do so in this review.4 Rather, my purpose is to examine Kahlenberg's per-
ceptions of life after law school and, in particular, his vision of the practice 
of corporate law. 
Underlying Kahlenberg's thesis about law schools' "breaches of contract" 
are three premises one might expect from someone never exposed to a legal 
education: (1) corporations and other business enterprises are inherently 
immoral; (2) any lawyer who elects to represent the legal interests of a busi-
ness enterprise is similarly immoral; and (3) any law school that emphasizes 
the intellectual tools a lawyer needs to represent the interests of any client, 
including a business enterprise, is likewise immoral. 
The first premise is grounded in old-fashioned populism;5 the second in 
the common but mistaken belief that lawyers necessarily embrace the values 
of their clients;6 and the third in the apparent conviction that a deliberately 
ideological legal education, one favoring discussions of justice rather than 
"boring" legal rules, 7 would be better than the current freedom-of-choice 
model. 
4 Note, however, the irony of Kahlenberg's focus on the "practicality" of his law 
school training. Most critics attack law schools because so much of today's training 
seems so useless. See, e.g., Harry T. Edwards, The Growing Disjunction Between Legal 
Education and the Legal Profession, 91 MICHL. REV. 34 (1992) (decrying law schools' 
emphasis on abstract theory at the expense of practical scholarship and pedagogy). 
5 Kahlenberg's mistrust of corporations is not an anomaly. Even today, many Ameri-
cans believe that organizational wealth is inconsistent with democratic ideals. Recent 
manifestations of this anxiety include the Supreme Court's expression of concern about 
the "corrosive" influence of corporations over the political process, Austin v. Michigan 
Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 658-60 (1990), and the decision by nine midwest-
ern states to bar non-family corporations from farming within state boundaries because of 
the perceived "social and economic evils" that agribusiness corporations represent, MSM 
Farms, Inc. v. Spire, 927 F.2d 330, 332 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 65 (1991) 
(rejecting a corporation's challenge to the Nebraska prohibition and finding it consistent 
with both equal protection and due process guarantees). 
6 Edward Bennett Williams described this phenomenon as "guilt by client." EVAN 
THOMAS, THE MAN TO SEE: EDWARD BENNETT WILLIAMs-ULTIMATE INSIDER, 
LEGENDARY TRIAL LAWYER 122 (1991). John W. Davis, founder of Davis, Polk & 
Wardwell, offered a spirited response to concerns expressed about guilt by client when he 
sought the Democratic nomination for president in 1924. Urged to resign from his firm 
to avoid any possibility of contamination by his corporate clients, Davis responded: 
Since the law, however, is a profession and not a trade, I conceive it to be the duty of 
the lawyer, just as it is the duty of the priest, or the surgeon, to serve those who call 
upon him unless indeed there is some insuperable obstacle in the way. No one in all 
this list of clients has ever controlled, or fancied that he could control, my personal 
or my political conscience. I am vain enough to imagine that no one ever will. 
BERYL H. LEVY, CORPORATION LAWYER: SAINT OR SINNER? 83 (1961). 
7 BROKEN CONTRACT, supra note 1, at 131. In complaining about legal rules, 
Kahlenberg picks a particularly sensitive area. Recalling his poverty law course, for 
example, he notes "(i]t was not interesting to know that when a rule says you have ten 
days to file, you do or do not count the days at both ends." Id. Although it may not be 
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In this review, I will resist the temptation to challenge Kahlenberg's peda-
gogical preferences, but will instead focus on his first and second points-
and his obvious scorn for business enterprises and the lawyers who represent 
them. 
Kahlenberg dismisses private practice as "amoral at best, immoral at 
worst,''8 "lucrative, prestigious, [and] challenging, [but] ultimately unsatisfy-
ing."9 His opinion is based primarily on a series of job interviews while he 
was still a law student, and his three-month summer internship at Boston's 
Ropes & Gray, where he specialized in trusts and estates "because it was 
reputed to have the best hours. "10 
In considering Kahlenberg's impressions of the legal profession, it may be 
useful to consider the views of a more experienced observer. Consequently, 
in this review I will also examine another recent legal memoir, this one writ-
ten by mergers and acquisitions specialist Lawrence Lederman.11 
Though I will juxtapose the two writers' stories, the books are in fact quite 
different. Kahlenberg's is polemical; Lederman's is simply autobiographical. 
Each, however, illustrates a carefully constructed personal vision of corpo-
rate law and the women and men who practice law. Taken together, the two 
books demonstrate how experience can color perception and how insight can 
overcome stereotype. 
I. THE OUTSIDER AND THE INSIDER 
In his application for admission to Harvard Law School, Rick Kahlenberg 
wrote: "Five years from now, I'd like to be pressing civil rights or liberties 
questions before the courts."12 Five years later, he was lobbying Senate col-
leagues for support of bills like the Metropolitan Washington, D.C. Waste 
Management Study Act13 and, during his free time, promoting his book on 
radio talk shows. Apparently, Kahlenberg was spending little time in the 
presence of, let alone defending the interests of, oppressed people. Mean-
while, young associates at Covington & Burling, the firm whose job offer 
Kahlenberg spurned, were serving six-month assignments at Neighborhood 
Legal Services offices at the firm's expense, 14 representing Salvadoran nation-
interesting, knowing the rules may significantly impact a client's life. See, e.g., Coleman 
v. Thompson, Ill S. Ct. 2546 (1991) (refusing to order hearing to consider new evidence 
of death-row inmate Roger Coleman's innocence because his pleading had been filed one 
day late). 
8 BROKEN CONTRACT, supra note 1, at 180. 
9 Id. at 5. 
10 Id. at 145. 
11 LAWRENCE LEDERMAN, TOMBSTONES: A LAWYER'S TALES FROM THE TAKE-
OVER DECADES (1992) [hereinafter TOMBSTONES). 
12 BROKEN CONTRACT, supra note 1, at 3. 
13 S. 1089, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991). 
14 See William J. Dean, Neighborhood Legal Services, N.Y. L.J., Oct. 15, 1990, at 3. 
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a1s summarily fired from their suburban landscaping jobs, 15 and advancing 
food stamp claims for local welfare recipients.16 
Like Rick Kahlenberg, Lawrence Lederman also changed direction early 
in his legal career. Setting out to become a law professor, he ended up dur-
ing the 1980s as a corporate lawyer at powerful Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & 
Katz. Ultimately, he became a key player in many of the decade's most 
intensely contested takeovers, going toe-to-toe with Boone Pickens and 
Michael Milken, among others. 
With this background, Lederman does not pretend that private practice is 
without its dark side. He recounts many all-nighters at the office,l7 concedes 
that pro bono work must get done, if at all, after hours, 18 and admits to his 
own occasional gamesmanship.19 If pressed, Lederman would surely con-
cede that law firm practice is often bruising; many lawyers are arrogant and 
some are cheats. 
Unlike Kahlenberg, however, Lederman can weigh these realities against 
some important countervailing considerations: law firm practice can be 
exhilarating;20 transactional lawyering, as well as litigation, can tap one's 
most creative and generative talents;21 lawyers are often instrumental in the 
15 See Michelle E. Klass, Alvarado, et a/. v. TLC Services, Inc., et a/., LEGAL TIMES, 
Dec. 9, 1991, at 17. 
16 See Michelle E. Klass, Quattlebaum, eta/. v. Dixon, eta/., LEGAL TIMES, July 15, 
1991, at 19. 
17 TOMBSTONES, supra note 11, at 44-45, 144-46, 304-07. 
18 Id. at 158. 
19 E.g., id. at 32 (describing his canny invocation of an obscure contractual provision 
to force the renegotiation of an entire contract); id. at 51 (describing his refusal to go 
forward with a planned public offering until a corporate executive-who had earlier dis-
missed him as a low level peon-treated him with respect). 
20 In a speech at Harvard Law School in 1920, lawyer Paul Cravath enthused about 
his corporate practice this way: 
A busy lawyer in New York ... works hard and is always meeting deadlines. But 
his life is never dull. He encounters human nature in all its manifold manifestations. 
He is in contact with fine minds. His work is spiced with action and variety. The 
practice of law itself becomes a mode of life. 
"I would rather work twelve hours a day as a lawyer," he avowed, "and go to bed 
tired after a day full of interest than to work six dull hours as a stockbroker and have 
six hours left for bridge and society." 
LEVY, supra note 6, at 90-91. 
Harrison Tweed, one of the founders of Milbank Tweed, was even more expansive. 
Commenting at a bar association function, Tweed uttered the lines that later became his 
epitaph: "[Lawyers] are better to work with or play with or drink with than most other 
varieties of mankind." PAUL HOFFMAN, LIONS OF THE EIGHTIES 50 (1982). 
21 Skadden, Arps lawyer James Freund notes the distinction between those lawyers 
who exercise their creative talents and those who do not: 
For want of a better term, I consider myself an activist lawyer-! believe that what a 
lawyer does or doesn't do, the initiative he takes or forsakes, can have a significant 
impact on the outcome of most matters and transactions; and that accordingly, the 
practitioner must at all times be alert, reach out and accomplish. There are also a 
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success of growing businesses; and most lawyers forge significant, enduring 
human connections with both their clients and co-workers. 
Kahlenberg sees a much narrower vision. Replaying familiar attacks on 
contemporary lawyers, 22 he seems to believe that corporate lawyers are noth-
ing more than highly paid plumbers whose success is dependent on their 
ability to make connections and who spend their careers knee-deep in other 
peoples' shit. 
In fact, however, most corporate lawyers engage in a far more complex 
and rewarding relationship with their work than Kahlenberg can even imag-
ine. The most effective corporate lawyers do not confuse their identities with 
those of their corporate clients.23 They do not spend every waking hour 
conjuring ways to "[make] the world safe for Morgan Guaranty."24 Rather, 
the best corporate lawyers are polymorphic operators deploying a wide 
range of intellectual and social skills, coordinating complex movements of 
people and materials, and ministering to the emotional needs of their clients. 
Most corporate lawyers are not dissatisfied with their work, 25 and most of 
them-properly-regard that work as socially valuable. 26 
A. Kahlenberg's Story 
Kahlenberg asks "how is it that so many students can enter law school 
determined to use law to promote liberal ideals and leave three years later to 
counsel the least socially progressive elements of our society?"27 He quickly 
great number of highly professional attorneys who take a Jess expansive, more reflec-
tive view of lawyering-and who nonetheless manage to accomplish much of value. 
The breed of lawyers, however, for whom I have little regard treat their practice as 
nothing more than reacting to external stimuli; ask me a specific question and I'll 
give you an even more specific answer .... 
JAMES C. FREUND, LAWYERING: A REALISTIC APPROACH TO LEGAL PRACTICE 3 
(1979). 
22 See, e.g., Derek Bok, A Flawed System of Law Practice and Training, 33 J.L. Eouc. 
570, 573 (1983) ("[F]ar too many ... individuals are becoming lawyers at a time when 
the country cries out for more talented business executives, more enlightened public ser-
vants, more inventive engineers, more able high school principals and teachers."). 
23 See, e.g., ROBERT L. NELSON, PARTNERS WITH POWER: THE SOCIAL TRANSFOR-
MATION OF THE LARGE LAW FIRM 249 (1988) (reporting results of a study that suggests 
that corporate lawyers, by and large, are more "liberal" than the clients they represent). 
24 BROKEN CoNTRACT, supra note 1, at 201. 
25 See infra note 91. In a poll sponsored by the National Law Journal in May of 1990, 
79% of the respondents reported they were satisfied with their careers as lawyers. Mar-
garet C. Fisk, Lawyers Give Thumbs Up, NAT'L L.J., May 28, 1990, at S2. In an informal 
"quality of life" poll conducted among Virginia lawyers in 1992, 68% of the respondents 
reported they were "totally" or "reasonably" satisfied with their careers. Donna Chil-
dress, Fax Poll: Two-Thirds of Lawyers Satisfied, 6 VA. LAW. WKLY. 1061, 1061 (1992). 
26 See, e.g., BROKEN CoNTRACT, supra note 1, at 41 (reporting a study in which 
"[s]ixty-seven percent of [Harvard Law graduates] believed they were contributing to the 
public good"). 
27 /d. at 5. For a thoughtful approach to answering this question, see ROBERT GRAN-
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rejects the notion that social idealism is nothing more than a phase through 
which most college students pass on their way to a more opportunistic view 
of the world.28 He also discounts explanations based solely on economics, 
observing-as if it were an adequate response-that Harvard (unlike most 
law schools) has a loan forgiveness program for graduates entering public 
interest practice.29 In the end, Kahlenberg concludes that "the most impor-
tant reasons that liberal law students [go] into corporate law [are] power, 
prestige, and convention. "30 
Unfortunately, Kahlenberg minimizes other common reasons law stu-
dents reject an exclusively public service practice, even though he admits 
they were important considerations in his own career choice. For example, 
Kahlenberg quit Harvard's Legal Aid Bureau before even starting because 
"[he] wasn't very good at the public speaking which litigation requires. Nor 
did [he] enjoy it. In addition, [he] had come to realize that poverty law was 
essentially social work and, as such, couldn't change the world .... "31 He 
also rejected a career as a prosecutor because, rather than addressing under-
lying social ills, he "could only try one case at a time."32 
More importantly, Kahlenberg found that he lacked the "level of profes-
sional dedication" required of a full-time public interest lawyer.33 "[D]oing 
anonymous legal-services work in the ghetto while swimming in debt"34 did 
not appeal to him, nor did the prospect of working for Ralph Nader at 
$18,000 a year.35 In addition, "public interest jobs just didn't distinguish 
you the way the high-salaried firms did."36 Indeed, Kahlenberg's choices 
FIELD, MAKING ELITE LAWYERS: VISIONS OF LAW AT HARVARD AND BEYOND (1992) 
(tracing development of law students' attitudes and values-their "moral transforma-
tion"-through the law school experience); ROBERT V. STOVER, MAKING IT AND 
BREAKING IT: THE FATE OF PUBLIC INTEREST COMMITMENT DURING LAW SCHOOL 
(1989) (examining the law school socialization process). 
28 BROKEN CONTRACT, supra note 1, at 6. 
29 Id. 
30 ld. at 7. This conclusion is not original. See CHRIS GOODRICH, ANARCHY AND 
ELEGANCE: CONFESSIONS OF A JOURNALIST AT YALE LAW SCHOOL 232 (1991) (recog-
nizing that most law students choose private practice for its "high pay, considerable pres-
tige, and great expectations"). By disparaging the motivations of young lawyers who 
select private practice, Kahlenberg seems to imply that "power, prestige, and conven-
tion" play no role in a public interest job search. He later acknowledges, however, that, 
"even in the egalitarian world of public-interest law, there [are] widely acknowledged 
pecking orders." BROKEN CONTRACT, supra note 1, at 37. Kahlenberg, himself, 
accepted a summer job in the Manhattan U.S. Attorney's office after he was advised that 
it was a "resume builder." Id. 
31 BROKEN CONTRACT, supra note 1, at 73-74. 
32 Id. at 68. 
33 Id. at 74. 
34 Id. at 233. 
35 Id. at 101. 
36 Id. at 4. 
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were limited, especially considering his stated unwillingness to put in long 
hours37 coupled with his desire to own waterfront property.38 
In his third year, Kahlenberg mercifully recognized what is quickly obvi-
ous to his readers: he should not have gone to law school. "[M]ore inter-
ested in policy than law,"39 Kahlenberg should probably have attended the 
Kennedy School of Government with his wife or sought meaningful work 
instead. In any event, Kahlenberg's decision to skip the bar exam to finish 
his book, pillorying his classmates who had more carefully chosen their 
graduate education, now seems largely gratuitous. It is, at the very least, 
evidence of his immaturity. 
When Kahlenberg is fifty, this book will probably embarrass him, not 
because it is poorly written-it is, in fact, quite lively40-but because it will 
so painfully remind him of a time in his life when everything seemed so 
simple, and everyone wore only one hat, black or white. 41 
B. Lederman's Story 
Lederman's book, unlike Kahlenberg's, does not claim to carry the weight 
of a thesis. Instead, Lederman merely traces his professional development 
from law school at New York University through his successful years at 
Wachtell, Lipton.42 
Following a clerkship with California Chief Justice Roger Traynor, Leder-
man joined Cravath, Swaine & Moore in November 1967. The product of a 
middle-class background, an admitted "stranger to corporate America,"43 
Lederman nevertheless joined Cravath's well-manicured corporate depart-
ment. Upon his arrival, he was assigned first to senior partner Frank Ran-
37 See supra text accompanying note 10. In fairness, one must note that, during law 
school, Kahlenberg seems to have been a very compulsive worker--diligently study-
grouping, conducting nationwide interviews for his seminar papers, interviewing for jobs, 
and compiling notes for his book. 
38 See BROKEN CONTRACT, supra note l, at 104-05 (revealing Kahlenberg's desire to 
provide his wife with a house on the waterfront). 
39 /d. at 180. 
4° Kahlenberg is at his best when he describes the vanities of his law professors and 
fellow students. Consider, for example, the following portrayal of Professor Martha 
Min ow: 
[T]hroughout the semester, Minow labored mightily to be hip. She would read 
poetry, make references to Freud, and begin many classes by asking if anyone had 
seen a good movie. She generally acted as if she was our friend, even though she was 
one of the few professors never to learn our names. 
/d. at 52. 
41 How much better this book might have been with 10 years of perspective-as well 
as Harvardian grace-behind it! Cf. THOMAS GEOGHEGAN, WHICH SIDE ARE You ON? 
TRYING TO BE FOR LABOR WHEN IT'S FLAT ON ITS BACK (1991). 
42 Lederman currently heads the corporate practice at New York's Milbank, Tweed, 
Hadley & McCloy. 
43 TOMBSTONES, supra note 11, at 8. 
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dolph and then, after two years, to another partner, William Marshall. 
Lederman learned important lessons from both men.44 
Ultimately satisfied that he could handle corporate transactions on his 
own-and perhaps convinced that partnership was unlikely-Lederman left 
Cravath in 1975 for upstart, and then unchic, Wachtell, Lipton. His career 
at the firm began with conventional buy-and-sell transactions, but Lederman 
quickly progressed to the heart of the emerging takeover market. In the 
early years, Lederman represented raiders as well as targets. Eventually, 
however, he found himself primarily acting on the defense side of the take-
over equation. 
Given the choice, Lederman says, he would have preferred representing 
raiders,45 whom he regards as "creative people pursuing personal visions."46 
However, Marty Lipton increasingly marketed his firm as a defense bou-
tique, and Lederman came to recognize a less attractive side of the raider 
mentality: 
[T]he game aspect of the raider's side sometimes elevated keeping score 
and beating your opponent above thinking about what the fighting was 
over. Among corporate executives making or contemplating their first 
hostile acquisition there was often a locker-room mentality. I found 
that all the mystery and excitement of sex, of breaking down resistance, 
of scoring and conquest, were associated with a takeover. Manliness 
was at stake, and measured.47 
He also came to empathize with the very real pain of his management cli-
ents: "I have never seen so many businessmen touch each other as in the 
44 Exposed to two quite different personalities, Lederman quickly discovered that style 
didn't always equate with success. 
[Randolph], in mid-life, was everything a Cravath partner shouldn't be. He was 
undisciplined, eccentric, and often bored with what he was doing. Recently divorced 
and courting the woman who would become his wife, he was unavailable for evening 
work. Moreover, after his father's demise he was unquestionably rich and, by 
Cravath standards, a playboy. 
/d. at 22-23. Marshall, on the other hand, was Randolph's "polar opposite: ... the most 
disciplined, careful, precise, and hardworking lawyer in the firm." /d. at 34. "He was an 
indefatigable worker, and worked as late as he had to, often without eating, to get the 
work done. He would regularly stay at the office until two or three in the morning .... 
Many days he would work around the clock .... " /d. at 41. Marshall was also uncom-
promising and often tyrannical. At times, these qualities prevented Marshall from serv-
ing as an effective advocate for his clients. See id. at 44-45. 
45 /d. at 108. 
46 /d. at 78. One critic of takeovers takes a somewhat different view. See JEFF 
MAD RICK, TAKING AMERICA: HOW WE GOT FROM THE fiRST HOSTILE TAKEOVER 
TO MEGAMERGERS, CORPORATE RAIDING AND SCANDAL 4 ( 1987) ("Most of those who 
drove mergers in the 1970s and 1980s were money men. They were rarely dreamers, or 
builders, or even men who could run a business. They were men who wanted, and knew 
how to make, money."). 
47 TOMBSTONES, supra note 11, at 109. 
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beginning of a tender offer, radiating warmth, camaraderie, and reassurance. 
Taboos about expressing feelings were set aside, overcome by the threat of 
loss of position, the imminent collapse of an ordered world. "48 
Ultimately, Lederman became a skilled defense tactician, structuring suc-
cessful management buyouts, developing unorthodox recapitalization tech-
niques, and perfecting, as a last resort, the auction process in which 
incumbent managers sold their companies to the highest bidder. He also 
logged pro bono time, serving as special counsel to Phoenix House, a New 
York City drug rehabilitation project. 49 
While at Wachtell, Lipton, Lederman came to appreciate the intimacy of 
a small, cohesive practice group. Describing the relationship much as one 
might describe a successful marriage, Lederman recalls that the "members 
of the firm trusted each other's judgment in all working matters" and used 
an abbreviated language, "a shorthand that was almost a code."50 However, 
Lederman also encountered betrayal in this familial setting. When Ilan 
Reich, a young partner Lederman had befriended, was caught in an insider 
trading scheme with investment banker Dennis Levine, 51 Lederman was dev-
astated. 52 Thereafter, Lederman often considered whether Wachtell, Lip-
ton's emphasis on wealth and success had hastened Reich's-and others'-
moral derailment.53 
In the end, Lederman left Wachtell, Lipton, apparently because his part-
ners disapproved of the disclosures in this book. 54 There is little in his book, 
however, to find objectionable. Although Lederman's writing is uneven-
some chapters are fluid and filled with human energy while others read like 
factual summaries in a legal brief-overall the book is both engaging and 
instructive. Lederman clearly found meaning and satisfaction in his decades 
of corporate practice. He hardly considers himself just a "droneD to wealthy 
clients,"55 driven by ambition and greed. 
II. TWO WRITERS' PERCEPTIONS OF A LIFE IN CORPORATE LAW 
Kahlenberg and Lederman understandably take very different views of the 
practice of law, both as they describe representative clients and as they 
describe representative lawyers. The differences are more than generational. 
For example, Kahlenberg portrays corporate clients as faceless banks and 
drug companies. Lederman, by contrast, savors the complexities of the 
48 Id. at 124. 
49 /d. at 156-66. 
50 /d. at 249. 
51 DENNIS B. LEVINE, INSIDE OUT: AN INSIDER'S ACCOUNT OF WALL STREET 
(1991) (recounting the role of llan Reich as one source of Levine's inside information). 
52 TOMBSTONES, supra note ll, at 245. 
53 Id. at 249. 
54 See Chris Goodrich, In Brief, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 15, 1992, Book Review, at 6. 
55 BROKEN CONTRACT, supra note 1, at 44. 
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human beings who are his real clients. Consider these portraits of two of 
Lederman's favorites: 
[Thomas Mellon Evans, CEO of H.K. Porter] was restless and 
mercurial, often scowling, engaged in projects that made him too busy 
on some days to get a haircut, and willing to eat sawdust-tasting sand-
wiches on his plane in order to pack two days of work into one. 56 
Bill Stokley III [CEO of Stokley-Van Camp] was short and compact, 
built to last. . . . [In researching ways to sell the company's Gatorade 
product, he] became knowledgeable about dieting and exercise 
trends. . . . Being sensitive to youthful aspirations, he shared them, 
which dispelled the stodginess that often seems to come with middle age 
and running a large business. 57 
More interesting, perhaps, than their differing perceptions of corporate 
clients are the two writers' very different perceptions of corporate lawyers. 
Listen as Kahlenberg describes his job interview with a Skadden, Arps part-
ner, one of the many "Neanderthal corporate slaves"58 he encountered dur-
ing his job-seeking marathon: 
His pep talk was all about "can-do," "hustle," "doing deals," and legal 
"entrepreneurship." He bragged that Skadden was the first American 
firm in Tokyo and that his work enabled him to travel at least two days 
a week. He said the leisurely three-hour lunch would be the downfall of 
the old-line firms and generally reveled in the crazy, unpredictable 
hours, trying to tum what might, to the untutored ear, be a fatal draw-
back into a convincing reason to practice at Skadden. I feigned interest, 
even though part of what I wanted from a law firm was a relaxed, gen-
teel, pipe-smoking atmosphere. If you were going to be a rich lawyer, 
you wanted to have more dignity than a traveling salesman. 59 
In contrast, consider Lederman's description of the way Frank Randolph, 
his first mentor at Cravath, approached the documentation of a complex 
corporate deal and shared his strategic thinking with Lederman, then an 
impressionable young associate: 
Frank was clever in handling the documentation. All lawyers are 
eager to prepare the papers, but Frank would usually let the other side 
do the first draft, which freed him to work on more than one or two 
deals at a time. That reversed the conventional wisdom that it's better 
to be the draftsman, for it is often thought that the hand that wields the 
pen controls the nuances of the transaction. Frank would comment, 
counterpunch as it were, telling me that you have to learn how to read 
closely as well as write closely. 
56 TOMBSTONES, supra note 11, at 77. 
57 /d. at 189. 
58 BROKEN CoNTRACT, supra note 1, at 101. 
59 /d. at 105. 
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There were two elements to look for in any draft: one was its accu-
racy in reflecting the deal, and the other, its omissions. The difficult 
part was to find what had been left out. Frank would start with "what 
if" and then go through the structure of the draft and see how it 
worked. For example, he would ask if United Fruit [Cravath's client] 
had to sell its subsidiary under [a sales] contract with RCA if it didn't 
get satisfactory regulatory approval. It might be possible to have to pay 
damages for failing to sell even though United Fruit wasn't permitted 
legally to sell. That would not be a happy result. The process of asking 
questions was like playing pinball. He'd run the ball through the maze 
and see what lit up and what didn't. He would spin ten or fifteen balls 
through with me, and the agreement would start to take on shape, then 
three dimensions and life. When its inadequacies showed, he asked the 
inevitable question: Could we layer on another level of complexity to 
account for the omissions? Of course.60 
Kahlenberg might regard this passage as supportive of his claim that a 
corporate law practice is "intellectually challenging, but in the same way as 
a crossword puzzle, with no greater social importance. "61 If so, he would 
confuse metaphor with meaning. As Lederman recognizes, deal making 
involves far more than mere gamesmanship. Most corporate transactions 
have important and foreseeable human consequences. 
Frank Randolph knew, for example, that United Fruit had to sell its tele-
communications subsidiary before the company's licenses to operate expired. 
Because of the intense governmental hostility toward United Fruit at the 
time, without the sale, the licenses would likely not have been renewed and 
the operation would have been closed down.62 Hundreds of jobs would be 
lost. 
Years later, in another transaction, both Lederman and his clients under-
stood that launching a management buyout bid for Stokley-Van Camp 
presented risks for its CEO. Once Bill Stokley, whose great-grandmother 
had founded the business in 1898, offered $55 per share, outside counterbid-
ders could buy the company simply by besting his offer. In fact, Quaker 
Oats eventually bought the company at $77 per share, extinguishing 
Stokley's birthright. 63 
Unlike problems posed in law school, neither of these transactions was a 
hypothetical exercise. Indeed, both transactions involved the classic dra-
matic values-hubris, tension, and resolution. 
Kahlenberg is also mistaken when he assumes a corporate legal practice 
deals exclusively with "the battle between (mostly) rich stockholders and 
rich managers. "64 The practice of corporate law impacts every corporate 
60 TOMBSTONES, supra note 11, at 28. 
61 BROKEN CONTRACT, supra note 1, at 220. 
62 TOMBSTONES, supra note 11, at 24. 
63 /d. at 201. 
64 BROKEN CONTRACT, supra note 1, at 130. Many shareholders are by no means 
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constituency. Moreover, law firms often have a direct impact on people who 
have no relationship with the firms' corporate clients, not only through the 
pro bono efforts of their litigation departments65 but also through the efforts 
of their transactionallawyers.66 Many corporate transactions produce unex-
pected social benefits. Lederman recounts, for example, one unintended 
consequence of his 1985 recapitalization of Multimedia, Inc., in which a 
$350 million disbursement to Multimedia shareholders generated the fund-
ing for the establishment of a fine arts center in Greenville, South Carolina, 
by a group of the founder's heirs. 67 
Although Multimedia involved an extraordinary transaction, every time 
corporate lawyers complete even the simplest deal, people's lives may be 
affected. Taking a company public, for example, may generate new jobs and 
products.68 Corporate mergers may also result in new jobs.69 Establishing a 
pension plan enhances workers' retirements while indirectly accomplishing 
other corporate goals. 70 Even selling moribund operating units may infuse 
them with new life and energy.71 
Clearly, however, not every corporate deal has such positive or even 
rich. In fact, one in four adult Americans now own equity securities, either directly or 
through a mutual fund. N.Y.S.E. FACT BooK 71 (1991). Of these owners, 15% have an 
annual household income of $25,000 or less. Id. at 72. 
65 See, e.g., ANTHONY LEWIS, GIDEON'S TRUMPET (1966) (recounting Abe Fortas's 
representation of Clarence Earl Gideon that culminated in the Supreme Court's reversal 
of a long-standing precedent concerning an indigent's right to counsel in criminal cases); 
GERALD M. STERN, THE BUFFALO MINE CREEK DISASTER (1976) (describing the effort 
by a team of lawyers at Arnold & Porter to help survivors of a ruinous flood to recover 
$13.5 million in damages from the mining company that had caused the flood). 
66 See Daniel Wise, New York Lawyers for Public Interest: 15 Years of Obtaining Coun-
sel, N.Y. L.J., Nov. l, 1991, at 1 (describing the pro bono activities of several law firm 
corporate departments, including counseling non-profit organizations on corporate, tax, 
real estate, and, occasionally, bankruptcy issues). "One new initiative on the non-litiga-
tion side has been to link three firms-Paul, Weiss, Rifkind, Wharton & Garrison; 
Cleary, Gottlieb, Steen & Hamilton; and Weil Gotshal & Manges-with parent groups in 
East Harlem, the Bronx and Williamsburg seeking to better conditions in their children's 
schools." Id. 
67 TOMBSTONES, supra note 11, at 208. 
68 See, e.g., John S.R. Shad, The Advantages and Disadvantages of Going Public, in 
WHY, WHEN AND How TO Go PUBLIC 26-28 (G. Scott Hutchison ed., 1970) (outlining 
the organizational and management benefits of going public). 
69 See, e.g., Charles Brown & James L. Medoff, The Impact of Firm Acquisitions on 
Labor, in CORPORATE TAKEOVERS: CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES 23 (Alan J. Auerbach 
ed., 1988) (estimating that in simple consensual company sales, post-sale employment 
goes up approximately nine percent). 
70 See, e.g., Shamrock Holdings, Inc. v. Polaroid Corp., 559 A.2d 257 (1989) (uphold-
ing corporation's use of employee stock option plan as an antitakeover device). 
71 See, e.g., GEORGE ANDERS, MERCHANTS OF DEBT 175 (1992) (describing the suc-
cess of Duracell after Kraft sold the company: "Duracell's sales soared; its market share 
climbed; it was a success story by any yardstick."). 
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benign social consequences. Corporate mergers, acquisitions, and buyouts 
may also eliminate jobs and even destroy companies. 72 What Kahlenberg 
and others misunderstand, however, is that in the end it is clients, not their 
lawyers, who create the deals and it is clients, not their lawyers, who alone 
are accountable for the consequences. This lesson, equally applicable to 
deals that fail as it is to deals that succeed, is illustrated by Lederman's 
account of his efforts to negotiate the sale to IBM of a corporate client, 
Neotec, a small, high-tech start-up firm. Although IBM's infusion of cash 
was essential to Neotec's survival and the negotiations had been successfully 
concluded, IBM aborted the deal at the eleventh hour. IBM's lawyer-a 
comer-office partner at Cravath-was mortified. Only after this experience 
could Lederman fully appreciate "that no matter how powerful a lawyer 
may be, he cannot commit to deliver his client. The lawyer advises and the 
client decides."73 
Finally, like many writers before him, Kahlenberg focuses on lawyerly 
greed. Throughout history, critics have often castigated lawyers for their 
desire and ability to make money from the woes of others. 74 In recent years, 
fictional best-sellers have frequently turned on the characterization of law-
yers as money-crazed yuppies.75 Apparently, readers enjoy seeing lawyers 
72 See, e.g., ANTHONY F. BUONO & JAMES L. BOWDITCH, THE HUMAN SIDE OF 
MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS 3-6, 12 (1989) (estimating that 10% of the American 
workforce was affected in some way by the mergers and acquisitions activity of the 1980s: 
tens of thousands of employees lost their jobs, and even those who did not lose their jobs 
experienced increased stress, anxiety, and resentment); Dwight Harshbarger, Mergers, 
Acquisitions, and the Reformatting of American Business, in THE HUMAN SIDE OF CoR-
PORATE COMPETITIVENESS 108 (Daniel Fishman & Cary Cherniss eds., 1990) ("Follow-
ing acquisitions during the period from 1981 to 1986, 500,000 executives lost jobs they 
had held for more than three years. 30% of them were still unemployed two years later. 
Among blue-collar workers approximately 34% were unemployed two years after the 
acquisition."). 
73 TOMBSTONES, supra note 11, at 71. 
74 Lawyers are plants that will grow in any soil that is cultivated by the hands of 
others, and when once they have taken root they will extinguish every vegetable that 
grows around them. The most ignorant, the most bungling member of that profes-
sion will, if placed in the most obscure part of the country, promote litigiousness and 
amass more wealth than the most opulent farmer with all his toil .... What a pity 
that our forefathers, who happily extinguished so many fatal customs and expunged 
from their new government so many errors and abuses both religious and civil, did 
not prevent the introduction of a set of men so dangerous. 
JESS M. BRALLIER, LAWYERS AND OTHER REPTILES 23 (1992) (quoting H. St. John 
Crevecoeur, 1787). 
75 See, e.g., JOHN GRISHAM, THE FIRM 9 (Dell Paperback 1991) (describing how a 
promising young law school graduate-Harvard, of course-is unwittingly lured into the 
Mafia simply because its "front," an attractive Memphis law firm, offers" '[a] base salary 
of eighty thousand the first year, plus bonuses. Eighty-five the second year, plus bonuses. 
A low-interest mortgage so you can buy a home. Two country club memberships. And a 
new BMW. You pick the color, of course.'"). 
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portrayed as avaricious cynics.76 The public does not buy and seldom reads 
serious chronicles like Lederman's, or those of James Stewart77 or Steven 
BrilF8-men who write with obvious affection for the honorable, yet fallible, 
people who practice corporate law. 
Unlike Kahlenberg, these men focus on the reality, rather than the 
mythology, of private practice. Writing as cultural historians, as well as 
journalists, they explore the increasingly complex challenges faced by the 
legal profession rather than fixating on some undergraduate notion of how 
lawyers might better behave in a market-free, stress-free world. 
III. PRIVATE PRACTICE IN A MARKET-DRIVEN, STRESS-LADEN WORLD 
It is unfortunate that Rick Kahlenberg chose the late 1980s to take his 
peek into the legal profession because during this period some lawyers, like 
many other professionals, often found themselves sacrificing both decorum 
and professional ethics in their quest for increased wealth.79 Not surpris-
ingly, complaints of professional misconduct increased during this period80 
as did the number of disputes over fees. 81 Most lawyers, however, struggled 
76 Currently enjoying enormous success, The Firm offers a remarkably dark depiction 
of the legal profession: 
"When you were in law school you had some noble idea of what a lawyer should be. 
A champion of individual rights, a defender of the Constitution; a guardian of the 
oppressed; an advocate for your client's principles. Then after you practice for six 
months you realize we're nothing but hired guns. Mouthpieces for sale to the high-
est bidder, available to anybody, any crook, any sleazebag with enough money to pay 
our outrageous fees. Nothing shocks you. It's supposed to be an honorable profes-
sion, but you'll meet so many crooked lawyers you'll want to quit and find an honest 
job. Yeah, Mitch, you'll get cynical. And it's sad, really." 
Jd. at 68-69. 
77 JAMES B. STEWART, THE PARTNERs-INSIDE AMERICA'S MosT POWERFUL LAW 
FIRMS (1983) (chronicling the role of lawyers in high-profile lawsuits and other major 
matters occurring in 1980, including the Chrysler bail out, Genentech's initial public 
offering, and the resolution of claims by Iran against American banks, which was a condi-
tion precedent for the release of American hostages). 
78 STEVEN BRILL, TRIAL BY JURY (1989) (reprinting the best stories and profiles from 
The American Lawyer for the period 1983 to 1988). 
79 See, e.g., STEVEN J. KUMBLE & KEVIN J. LA HART, CONDUCT UNBECOMING: THE 
RISE AND RUIN OF FINLEY, KUMBLE (1990) (recounting how greed, power-lust, and 
unbridled self-enrichment led to the demise of the first national law firm in 1987). 
80 See Margaret C. Fisk, The Year in Review: 1990 Was a Year of Uncertainty for the 
Profession, NAT'L L.J., Jan. 7, 1991, at S2 (discussing firms' recent accountability for the 
practices of the 1980s, including the siphoning of money from judgments scheduled for 
victims and the filing of frivolous claims). 
81 See, e.g., ·~ .. In the Spirit of Public Service": A Blueprint for the Rekindling of 
Lawyer Professionalism: Report of the Commission on Professionalism to the Board of Gov-
ernors and the House of Delegates of the American Bar Association, 112 F.R.D. 243, 283 
(1986) (citing fees as a major source of criticism and misunderstanding between attorneys 
and their clients). 
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to reposition themselves during the 1980s-trying to compete in a con-
tracting marketplace while continuing to uphold the ethical traditions of 
their profession. They did so, for the most part, by working harder than 
ever.82 
Today, as a consequence, many lawyers find themselves stretched to their 
emotional limits. Associates complain of inhumane working conditions;83 
partners lament a decline in civility.84 Recent graduates often regret their 
career choice85 and many more experienced lawyers are fleeing the profes-
sion altogether.86 Reflecting a widespread sense of malaise among lawyers, a 
recent Johns Hopkins study showed lawyers topping the list of professionals 
most likely to suffer from depression. 87 
The fact is, the private practice of law has become as grueling a business 
as electoral politics-not, as Kahlenberg believes, because it is morally sus-
pect, but because it has become economically inefficient. In a 1990 survey of 
members of the American Bar Association, about half of the lawyers in pri-
vate practice said they no longer have enough time for themselves or their 
families. 86 Nearly three-quarters said they regularly felt exhausted and 
"worn out" by the end of the workday.89 
The human cost of this transformation has been substantial: 
82 See The State of the Legal Profession 1990, 1991 A.B.A. YOUNG LAW. DIVISION 23 
[hereinafter The State of the Legal Profession] (presenting survey results indicating that 
lawyers worked much longer hours in 1990 than in 1984). 
83 See At the Breaking Point: A National Conference on the Emerging Crisis in the 
Quality of Lawyers' Health and Lives-Its Impact on Law Firms and Client Services, 1991 
A.B.A. YOUNG LAW. DIVISION l (reporting a survey that demonstrates the negative 
effect that the deteriorating work environment has on associates' mental and physical 
well-being). 
84 See COMMITIEE ON CIVILITY, SEVENTH FED. JUDICIAL CIRCUIT, INTERIM 
REPORT OF THE COMMITIEE ON CIVILITY OF THE SEVENTH FEDERAL JUDICIAL CIR-
CUIT 16-22 (1991) (describing aggressive litigation practices and a deterioration of profes-
sional courtesies within the three-state circuit). 
85 See Alex M. Johnson, Jr., Think Like a Lawyer, Work Like a Machine: The Disso-
nance Between Law School and Law Practice, 64 S. CAL. L. REV. 1231, 1231 (1991) 
(discussing the disillusioning difference between law school and legal practice and observ-
ing that former law students who return to their law schools and chat with professors 
"would rather discuss the prospect of leaving their large firms for academia or smaller 
firms than discuss the current students they are trying to recruit"). 
86 See generally DEBORAH L. ARRON, RUNNING FROM THE LAW: WHY GOOD LAW-
YERS ARE GETIING OUT OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION (2d ed. 1991) (featuring interviews 
with attorneys who have quit practicing law and offering career tips for lawyers seeking 
to leave the legal profession). 
87 William W. Eaton et al., Occupations and the Prevalence of Major Depressive Disor-
der, 32 J. OCCUPATIONAL MED. 1079, 1081 (1990) (finding that lawyers "have decidedly 
higher levels of depression than the 3% to 5% found ... among the general population"). 
88 The State of the Legal Profession, supra note 82, at 17. 
89 /d. at 24. 
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A 1990 survey of New Jersey lawyers revealed that 23 percent [of 
respondents] plan to leave the practice before they retire; in Maryland, 
nearly one-third of lawyers surveyed by the state bar association in 1988 
said they were not sure whether they wanted to continue practicing law; 
and 23 percent of North Carolina lawyers responding to a 1990 survey 
told their bar association they would not become attorneys again.90 
In short, although private practice retains many attractive features,91 it 
has become an increasingly punishing way to make a living. It is under-
standable that a student like Rick Kahlenberg chose not to pursue this 
career path; what is less forgivable is that he has no compassion for those 
who, for motives as legitimate as his, chose otherwise. 
CONCLUSION 
Rick Kahlenberg has a keen sense for other peoples' weaknesses; unfortu-
nately, however, he is less insightful into his own. He is utterly oblivious to 
the irony of a career choice that regards backroom politics for an ambitious 
first-term Senator as morally superior to any work that a well-trained corpo-
rate lawyer might perform. 
Kahlenberg's narrow vision of the practice of law is what one might 
expect from a person with his limited perspective. Lawrence Lederman once 
shared a similar view when, during his first day at Cravath, he worried that 
"everything at the firm seemed more routine and less challenging than [he] 
thought it would be. "92 Lederman now recognizes the error of his early 
judgment: "I should have understood that the reality of the institution is 
90 Nancy D. Holt, Are Longer Hours Here To Stay? Quality Time Losing Out, A.B.A. 
J., Feb. 1993, at 62, 62. It should be noted, however, that escapist attitudes are not 
unique to lawyers. See, e.g., Working Conditions: Survey of Texas Teachers Shows Higher 
Level of Dissatisfaction, 28 Gov't Empl. Rel. Rep. (BNA) No. 1366, at 679 (May 28, 
1990) (discussing a survey of teachers in Texas showing that 45.1% are considering leav-
ing the profession); Ethan Bronner, Survey Finds Lawyers Are Generally Happy with 
Their Careers, BOSTON GLOBE, May 21, 1990, at 3 (presenting results of recent poll 
indicating that 40% of surveyed physicians would probably or definitely not enter medi-
cal school if they had to do it all over again); Amy Goldstein, Veteran Teachers Give 
Rookies Lesson in Reality, WASH. PosT, Nov. 13, 1990, at B1 ("Nationally, half of all 
new teachers quit within five years."). In addition, although some observers have pre-
dicted that "so many lawyers [are] disgruntled that a mass exodus from the profession [is] 
imminent," only nine percent of the attorneys participating in a recent survey indicated a 
clear intent to leave the profession. Fisk, supra note 25, at S2. 
91 In the 1990 ABA survey, 91% of the respondents agreed with the statement that "I 
am respected and treated as a colleague by my superiors;" 90% agreed that "the intellec-
tual challenge of my work is great;" 88% believed that their work atmosphere was 
"warm and personal;" 82% that "the opportunity for professional development is very 
good;" 74% that "I have considerable control over the selection of cases/matters that I 
handle;" and 72% that "political intrigue and backbiting is almost nonexistent" in the 
law firm setting. The State of the Legal Profession, supra note 82, at 17-20. 
92 TOMBSTONES, supra note 11, at 21. 
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often not the image that it projects for itself and that it couldn't be under-
stood in a short time."93 That lesson applies to firms like Cravath even 
today. 
A corporate law practice is seldom the contentious battleground, the 
cathedral of greed, or even the paperwork wasteland it often appears to be to 
the uninitiated. It is hardly, as Kahlenberg suggests, the evil empire. 
Instead, corporate practice is an evolving, and very human, phenomenon. 
Just as Lawrence Lederman no longer defends against many hostile take-
overs these days, corporate law firms no longer dominate docile clients, sup-
press inter-firm competition for rainmakers, or attempt to influence judges 
the way they did just a few years ago. Instead, firms are struggling to find 
ways to make their lawyers' lives more liveable while still serving the needs 
of equally stressed clients in a complex, electronically interconnected, global 
marketplace. These efforts deserve some credit, especially from self-styled 
liberals. 
Today's corporate lawyers need thoughtful discussion about integrating 
personal and professional obligations into their everyday practice. They 
don't need more sermons from sanctimonious bystanders about the moral 
depravity of their profession. 
93 /d. 
